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David M. Cutler and Mark B. McClellan 
The rising cost of health care has been among the most vexing problems facing 
the public sector in the past three decades. Spending on health care accounts 
for nearly 20 percent of federal revenues and a similar share of state and local 
revenues. With real per capita health costs increasing by 4 to 5 percent annu- 
ally, understanding the determinants of health care cost growth has become a 
substantial public concern. 
Efforts to limit cost growth in the public sector have typically focused on 
price mechanisms. By lowering rates for the services it pays for, the federal 
government has hoped to limit overall reimbursement for medical care. And 
yet health costs continue to rise. Real per enrollee Medicare costs increased by 
over 6 percent annually between 1991 and 1993. 
In this paper we explore the causes of this cost growth in detail. We begin 
with a discussion of the growth of inpatient Medicare costs. We show that the 
price that Medicare pays for admissions has been falling over time but the 
technological intensity of the treatment has been increasing. Since more inten- 
sive technologies are reimbursed at a higher rate than less intensive technolog- 
ies, the growth of  technology is at least partly responsible for the growth of 
Medicare costs. 
To gain further insights into these trends, we then turn to a detailed analysis 
of expenditure growth for one particular condition-acute  myocardial infarc- 
tions (AMIs), or heart attacks, in elderly Medicare beneficiaries. Section 2.2 
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reviews the technical details of AM1 treatment and reimbursement. The tech- 
nologies used in treating AM1 have progressed dramatically in the past decade. 
In the early 1980s, treatment for heart attacks consisted principally of medical 
management of the patient, primarily involving monitoring  techniques, phar- 
macologic interventions, and counseling. During the 1980s, several new inten- 
sive technologies  were  implemented  widely. These technologies,  including 
cardiac catheterization, coronary artery bypass  surgery, and coronary angio- 
plasty, have had major consequences for patient treatment. In section 2.3, we 
quantify their effects on Medicare expenditures. In 1984, about 11 percent of 
people with a heart attack received one or more of these intensive treatments. 
Over the next seven years, the use of these treatments nearly quadrupled. As a 
result, even though the price of particular treatments for AMIs was constant or 
even falling, spending on heart attacks rose by 4 percent annually. 
In section 2.4, we begin to develop evidence on the nature of this technologi- 
cal change by comparing the growth of technology across metropolitan statisti- 
cal areas (MSAs). We consider a common contention-that  new and cheaper 
technologies will  substitute for older and  more expensive technologies and 
thus lower costs. The most recent innovation for AM1 treatment, angioplasty, 
is substantially cheaper than bypass surgery; thus, substitution of angioplasty 
for bypass  surgery  could  potentially  reduce  cost  growth.  Looking  across 
MSAs, however, we find no evidence that areas with more rapid growth of 
angioplasty have had less rapid growth of  bypass  surgery. We thus conclude 
that angioplasty has added significantly to the cost of AM1 treatment by ex- 
tending intensive interventions to a larger segment of AM1 patients. We  then 
look across MSAs to see whether some MSAs are technology “leaders” and 
others are “followers.” We find evidence that this is the case. Areas in which 
bypass surgery was more prevalent in  1984 are the first to adopt angioplasty, 
and they use this procedure more often. 
In  section 2.5, we begin to explore the sources of  intensity  growth within 
geographic areas by considering the contribution of technology acquisition by 
hospitals to intensity growth. We find that technology diffusion to new facili- 
ties accounts for much intensity growth but that more frequent use of intensive 
technologies within hospitals is also important, especially for the continued 
growth of relatively “established” technologies such as bypass surgery. 
We conclude our exploration of technological change in the management of 
AM1 in the elderly with a review of some of the questions raised by our prelim- 
inary studies, suggesting a potential agenda for further research on the determi- 
nants of technological change in health care. 
2.1  The Sources of Medicare Cost Increases 
Figure 2.1 shows the growth of  Medicare hospital payments per beneficiary 
from  1968 through  1993. The figure is concerning from the perspective  of 
federal expenditures. From  1965 to the early 1980s, Medicare paid hospitals 53  What Is Technological Change? 
Year 
Fig. 2.1 
Source: Prospective Payment Assessment Commission (1994). 
Growth in real spending per beneficiary, Medicare inpatient services 
on a retrospective, cost-plus basis. Generally, hospitals reported the costs of 
treating each patient and were reimbursed that amount.’ Real payments per 
beneficiary grew rapidly during this period, at an annual rate of over 6 percent. 
By the early 1980s, it was apparent that a new payment system was needed. As 
a result, in fiscal year 1984 the federal government began paying for Medicare 
admissions on a more prospective basis, termed the Prospective Payment Sys- 
tem (PPS).z 
Under PPS, all admissions are grouped into one of  roughly 470 diagnosis- 
related groups (DRGs)-a  collection of related diagnoses, for example, “cir- 
culatory disorders with acute myocardial infarction and cardiovascular compli- 
cations.” DRGs are assigned a relative weight, reflecting the cost of  treating 
patients in that DRG compared to the national average cost of a hospital admis- 
sion. Circulatory disorders with AM1 and cardiovascular complications, for 
example, has a relative weight in 1995 of  1.60. Reimbursement is the product 
of the DRG weight and the hospital’s update factor: 
(1)  Reimbursement/patient,,, = Weight,  -  Update, . 
1. The system was more complicated than this; for example, hospital payments for specific 
services were subject to “reasonable cost” regulation, and reimbursement for capital costs was 
also regulated. But hospitals had relatively few incentives to limit costs. 
2. See Cutler (199%)  for a more detailed description of  the implementation of  prospective 
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The update factor is on the order of $4,000 per DRG unit for a typical hospi- 
tal.3 Thus, a typical hospital  would receive about $6,400 for the circulatory 
disorder patient noted above. Hospitals receive approximately the same pay- 
ment for all patients in a given DRG, regardless of what services they perform. 
It was hoped that prospective payment would solve the budget problem. To- 
tal reimbursement is given by 
Reimbursement,,  =  Weight,  Update,, . 
panena  (2) 
By controlling the update factor, the government can, in principle, control the 
growth of total   pen ding.^ As figure 2.1 shows, however, this has not been the 
case. While real cost growth was low for several years after the implementation 
of PPS, in recent years cost growth has again accelerated. 
Table 2.1 presents evidence on why Medicare payments have increased. The 
first column shows the growth of reimbursement per di~charge.~  Reimburse- 
ment growth was very rapid in 1984 and then slowed substantially in the next 
several years. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, cost growth accelerated. 
The rapid increase in payments  has not been because of  increases in the 
update factor. As the second column of table 2.1 shows, the real update factor 
has been zero or negative almost every year since prospective payment  was 
implemented. The reason for cost increases, in contrast, has been that the aver- 
age patient  has been in increasingly higher weighted  DRGs over time. The 
average DRG weight  of  Medicare  admissions  (the first term in  eq.  [2])  is 
known as the “case-mix index” and is displayed in the third column of  table 
2.1. The case-mix index has grown at 2 to 3 percent annually since the middle 
of the 1980s. 
There are two principal reasons for the increase in case-mix index over time. 
The first is termed “upcoding”-the  incentive for hospitals to place patients 
into higher weighted DRGs and thus receive greater reimbursement. Several 
studies suggested that upcoding of patients was a substantial part of the dra- 
matic increase in DRG weights associated with the implementation of prospec- 
tive payment.6 
3. There are additional payments for teaching hospitals, hospitals that care for the poor, capital 
costs, and patients that are large outliers in terms of resources, but the text describes the most 
important part of reimbursement. 
4.  Note that this refers only to inpatient spending. Any substitution in the site of care-e.g.. 
moving rehabilitation services out of the hospital, shifting psychiatric patients to separate facili- 
ties, or increasing use of outpatient surgeries-will  show up as lower inpatient costs but increases 
in other spending. 
5. The difference between this column and fig. 2.  I  is the share of beneficiaries who are hospital- 
ized in a given year. In the first several years after PPS was adopted, the admission rate fell by  3 
percent annually. Since then, the reduction in admissions has been less dramatic. 
6.  E.g., Carter and Ginsberg (1985) and Carter, Newhouse, and Relles (1990) estimated that 
over one-third of the case-mix index increase in the first few years of PPS was due to the “creep” 
of patients whose treatment did not change into more complex DRGs, principally from DRGs 
without complicating conditions to DRGs with a specified set of complicating conditions. Indeed, 
the sense that much  of the growth of costs was due to DRG upcoding was one reason for the 
extremely low increase in the update factor in the 1986-88  period. 55  What Is Technological Change? 
Table 2.1  Sources of Medicare Inpatient Hospital Cost Increases 
Reimbursement/ 




































Source: Prospective Payment Assessment Commission (1995). 
Note: Costs and update are in real terms relative to the GDP  deflator. 
"Reflects 1.22 percent across-the-board reduction in DRG weights. 
The second reason for increases in the case-mix index, and the one we focus 
on most heavily, is technological change. While reimbursement within a DRG 
does not depend on an individual patient's costs, DRGs do distinguish between 
patients who receive surgery and those who do not. Surgical DRGs generally 
have higher weights than medical DRGs for similar patients. As a result, when 
more patients receive intensive  surgical treatments, the case-mix index will 
increase, as will Medicare payments. This is particularly important because 
technological change has been an integral feature of the U.S. health system for 
the past 50 years (Newhouse 1992). 
We illustrate how technological change may affect growth of Medicare pay- 
ments using treatment for AMIs (heart attacks) in the elderly. 
2.2  AM1 Treatments and Reimbursement: Technical Background 
Acute  myocardial  infarction  (AMI)  exemplifies  technological  change  in 
health  care. AM1 is a common condition in the elderly (about 230,000 new 
cases per year), the cost involved is substantial (over $10,000 per case in one- 
year hospital costs alone), and treatment involves a variety of intensive techno- 
logies with important cost implications. In addition, patients diagnosed with 
an AM1 will always be hospitalized, so there are no consequential issues of 
changes in the site of  care. 
We  divide AM1 treatments into four groups of treatment intensity. Figure 
2.2 shows a schematic diagram of AM1 treatments,  and table 2.2 shows the 
intensity groups and principal DRGs with which they are associated. The least 
invasive treatment for an AM1 patient is medical management (the lower part 
of fig. 2.2).  This typically involves drug therapy, monitoring, and (in the longer 
run) counseling and treatment for reducing risk factors such as high cholesterol 
levels and smoking. Medical management of AM1 leads to one of three DRG 
classifications, based on the patient's health characteristics: circulatory disor- Catheterize  Angioplasty 
(lm  - other cardiovascular procedures in 1984) 
(112-angioplastyin  1991) 
No Further Procedures 
(121,122,123-ifinitialadmission) 
(124 - cath with  mmplex diagnosis) 
(125 - cath  without complex diagnosis) 
Medical Management 
(121 - AM1 with complications) 
(122 - AM1 without complications) 
Fig. 2.2  Treatment of heart attacks 
Table 2.2  Reimbursement for Patients with AMI, 1984 and 1991 
Treatment  DRG 
Weight 





121 Circulatory disorders with AM1 
and cardiovascular complications 
122 Circulatory disorders with AM1 
without cardiovascular 
complications 
123 Circulatory disorders with 
AMI, expired 
124 Circulatory disorders (no AMI) 
with catheterization and complex 
diagnosis 
125 Circulatory disorders (no AMI) 
with catheterization without 
complex diagnosis 
106 Coronary bypass with 
catheterization 
107 Coronary bypass without 
catheterization 
108 Cardiothoracic procedures 
except valve and bypass, with pump 










,6210  -  12 
,1667  ~  14 
,3920  24 
,1973  ~  46 
0.7387  -55 
5.4470  -5 
4.9616  26 
2.0163  -53 
Source: Prospective Payment Assessment Commission (1985, 1991). 57  What Is Technological Change? 
ders with AM1 and cardiovascular complications (DRG 121); circulatory disor- 
ders with AM1 without cardiovascular complications (DRG 122); and circula- 
tory disorders with AMI, expired (DRG 123). As table 2.2 shows, the weight 
of DRG 121 declined from 1.85 to 1.62, and the weight of DRG 122 declined 
from  1.35 to  1.17-roughly  12 to  14 percent. The weight of  DRG  123 in- 
creased during this period, from 1.12 to 1.39. 
An alternative to “medical” management of an AM1 is to use one or more 
invasive cardiac procedures (the upper branch of fig. 2.2). Invasive treatment 
begins with a cardiac catheterization, a diagnostic procedure that involves in- 
serting a catheter into the entrance of the blood vessels supplying the heart and 
injecting  dye. This procedure  documents areas of  no flow or limited  flow, 
which may be involved in the current or possible subsequent AMIs. Performing 
a cardiac catheterization requires a specialized cardiac catheterization labora- 
tory, with dedicated equipment and a specially trained staff of  cardiologists 
and cardiac nurses. 
Reimbursement  for patients  who undergo a catheterization  is somewhat 
complicated. If a patient receives a catheterization during initial AM1 admis- 
sion, reimbursement is in  one of  the AM1 DRGs noted above (121,  122, or 
123). If a patient is readmitted specifically for a catheterization, the readmis- 
sion is reimbursed in DRG 124 or 125-circulatory  disorders (no AMI) with 
catheterization  witwwithout  complex  diagnosis.  As  table  2.2  shows,  the 
weights  for both  of  these  DRGs declined substantially  between  1984 and 
1991-by  about 50 percent. 
If  the catheterization procedure detects important blockages in the arteries 
supplying the heart, more intensive revascularization procedures may be used 
to treat the blockages. The first, older technology is coronary artery bypass 
graft (CABG) surgery. CABG is a highly intensive, open-heart surgical proce- 
dure that involves grafting arteries or leg veins to bypass occluded or near- 
occluded regions of the heart’s blood flow. A more recent innovation in coro- 
nary revascularization, which is less intensive than CABG, is percutaneous 
transluminal coronary angioplasty (PTCA). In this procedure, a balloon-tipped 
catheter is inserted into the blocked artery and inflated, with the goal of restor- 
ing  blood  flow  through  the artery without  having to undertake  open-heart 
~urgery.~ 
Patients who receive bypass surgery are placed in DRG 106 or 107, which 
are defined exclusively for patients who undergo CABG (the DRGs differ in 
whether catheterization  was or was not performed  on the same admission). 
DRG 106 had weights of 5.21 in 1984 and 5.45 in 1991, far above either medi- 
cal management or catheterization without further surgical procedures. 
Reimbursement for angioplasty (PTCA) has a more complex regulatory his- 
tory, reflecting its relatively recent development. In  1984, angioplasty was a 
7. Sometimes, PTCA procedures are performed in  association with stent placement (it.,  the 
insertion of  a mesh tube into reopened artery to help prevent the artery from closing off again). 58  David M. Cutler and Mark B. McClellan 
virtually new procedure. Patients who underwent angioplasty were placed in 
DRG 108-cardiothoracic  procedures except valve and bypass, with pump- 
which included a variety of other invasive cardiac procedures, most of which 
were more intensive than  angioplasty. The DRG weight, 4.33 in  1985, was 
high relative to average resource requirements for performing angioplasty. As 
angioplasty became more common, Medicare officials realized it was substan- 
tially overreimbursed.  In fiscal year  1986, angioplasty was moved into DRG 
112, with a much lower weight of 2.02 in 1991. Even with this lower weight, 
however, angioplasty is still reimbursed considerably more than medical man- 
agement of AM1 or catheterization without additional surgery. Thus, increases 
in the rate of angioplasty over time will lead to increases in Medicare spending, 
provided they result from use of angioplasty in patients who would have been 
treated medically rather than with CABG. 
2.3  AM1 Treatments and Reimbursement, 1984-91 
To examine the effects of these technological changes on Medicare costs, we 
assembled a data set consisting of essentially all elderly Medicare beneficiaries 
admitted with an AM1 between  1984 and  1991. The data set was created in 
several steps.* 
We began with all hospital claims for every Medicare beneficiary who had 
an  AM1 in this time period. We excluded nonelderly  patients, patients treated 
in HMOs, patients who did not have continuous Medicare enrollment follow- 
ing their AMIs (unreliable claims data), patients who were treated for their 
AMIs outside acute care U.S. hospitals,  and patients whose lengths of stay 
(less than five days, discharged to home alive) made it very unlikely that they 
had “true” AMIs. We used reported procedure codes to identify use of cardiac 
procedures and secondary diagnoses at the time of  initial AM1 admission to 
identify complicating conditions preceding the AMI. We used unique patient 
identifiers to link all hospital admissions for each patient over time, enabling 
us to identify the most intensive cardiac treatment received by each patient in 
the 90-day episode of care after the AMI. On average there were about 230,000 
new AM1 patients admitted each year; this cohort size declined slightly during 
the time period of the study. Table 2.3 shows the number of patients by year. 
Our data also contain information on the DRG assignment for each admis- 
sion  and  on the  total  DRG payments  (including  any  outlier payments  and 
hospital-specific  adjustments) for each admission. We use this information to 
determine the total hospital payments for each patient  in the year after AM1 
and to determine the total weight of the DRG payments (without outlier and 
hospital-specific  adjustments). For this section, we concentrate on reimburse- 
8. These data were assembled as part of a larger project on the costs and benefits of  intensive 
medical treatment in the elderly. See McClellan and Newhouse (1994) and McClellan, McNeil, 
and Newhouse (1994) for more detail. 59  What Is Technological Change? 
Table 2.3  Number of Observations 
Year  Number 
1984  233,295 
1985  233,898 
1985  223,589 
1987  227,925 
1988  223,199 
1989  21 8,269 
1990  22 1,167 
1991  227,182 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
ment information for patients treated in 1984 and 1991. We analyze payments 
for hospital stays only; spending for physician services and outpatient services 
are not included. Measuring these costs involves linking together a much more 
extensive set of patient records, which we have not yet attempted. 
Table 2.4  documents how DRG weights  translate into reimbursement for 
AM1 patients and how reimbursement for the different intensity  groups has 
changed over time. AM1 patients tend to receive intensive cardiac procedures 
soon after the AM1 occurs.  Nonetheless, treatment for even an acute health 
shock such as AM1 involves a series of decisions over time involving not only 
procedure use but also decisions about transfers and readmissions after the 
patient  initially  presents with AMI.  Because  DRG payments  are admission 
based, the weights of AMI-related DRGs as well as number and DRG weights 
of subsequent admissions affect cumulative payments. 
To  determine the contribution of these effects to the growth in AM1 reim- 
bursement, we grouped all admissions during the year after AM1 into DRG 
categories corresponding to our AM1 treatment intensity categories, plus a re- 
sidual category consisting of  all other admissions. The change in reimburse- 
ment for each AM1 treatment intensity  group depends on the change in the 
frequency of admissions and the change in DRG weight for each type of ad- 
mission. 
The first row of table 2.4 shows that patients who receive only medical man- 
agement averaged around 1.1 admissions in a medical management AM1 DRG 
in both 1984 and 1991,  just over half of their total admissions in the year dating 
from their AMI. The average cumulative DRG weight of the admissions for 
patients with medical management increased slightly, from 2.6 1 to 2.87, be- 
tween  1984 and  1991. This increase was due entirely to a somewhat higher 
number and intensity of non-AM1 admissions for these AM1 patients. 
The second row of table 2.4 shows the corresponding admission pattern for 
patients treated with catheterization but no revascularization  procedures after 
AMI. The medical management AM1 DRGs were also the most important de- 
terminant of payments in this treatment intensity group. DRGs related to cathe- Table 2.4  Average Admissions and DRG Weights for Patients with AM1 
1984 AM1 Patients  1991 AM1 Patients  Change, 1984-91 
Admits in Specific Types of DRGs  Admits in Specific Types of DRGs  Admits in Specific Types of DRGs 
All  All  All 
Treatment  Admits  Med  Cath  CABG  PTCA  Other  Admits  Med  Cath  CABG  PTCA  Other  Admits  Med  Cath  CABG  PTCA  Other 
I. Medical management 
Admits  1.94  1.12 
Weight  2.61  1.62 
2. Catheterization 
Admits  2.55  1.31 
Weight  3.88  1.96 
3. Bypass surgery (CABC) 
Admits  2.83  0.91 
Weight  7.03  1.36 
4. Angioplasgi (PTCA) 
Admits  2.48  0.65 
Weight  6.62  0.95 
0.02  0.01  0.00  0.80  2.05  1.08  0.02 
0.03  0.05  0.01  0.90  2.87  1.56  0.02 
0.34  0.04  0.02  0.83  2.43  1.23  0.16 
0.62  0.18  0.08  1.05  3.63  1.74  0.17 
0.10  0.97  0.01  0.85  2.66  0.68  0.06 
0.18  4.36  0.04  1.10  7.93  0.96  0.06 
0.16  0.03  1.07  0.57  2.61  0.59  0.11 

















0.94  0.11  -0.04 
1.20  0.26  -0.06 
0.95  -0.12  -0.08 
1.47  -0.25  -0.22 
0.98  -0.17  -0.23 
2.09  0.90  -0.40 
0.78  0.13  -0.06 









0.00  0.01  0.14 
0.01  0.01  0.30 
-0.01  0.03  0.12 
-0.03  0.03  0.42 
-0.07  0.03  0.13 
0.39  0.04  0.99 
0.01  0.02  0.21 
0.07  -2.43  0.57 
Nore: The weight is the average cumulative DRG weight for patients receiving that treatment. 61  What Is Technological Change? 
terization accounted for a weight of 0.62 in 1984 but fell to 0.17 by  1991. In 
part, this fall was the result of a trend toward performing catheterization earlier 
after AMI. In  1984, almost one-third of patients treated with catheterization 
only were initially admitted in a medical management AM1 DRG and subse- 
quently readmitted in a catheterization DRG. By 1991, about one-seventh of 
patients followed this admission pattern; the remainder were treated with cath- 
eterization on their initial admission and thus only were admitted in the medi- 
cal management AM1 DRGs. Coupling this trend in admissions with the reduc- 
tion in DRG weights for both medical management and catheterization outside 
of an AMI, the result was a substantial reduction in payment for patients receiv- 
ing only catheterization; this reduction was only partially offset by more inten- 
sive admissions in other categ~ries.~ 
The last two rows of  table 2.4 describe treatment and reimbursement pat- 
terns for patients receiving catheterization and revascularization. The cumula- 
tive DRG weight for patients receiving bypass increased, as a result of an in- 
crease in the average DRG weight for admissions in CABG DRGs and an 
increase in the intensity of admissions in the “other” DRG category (princi- 
pally more use of other intensive surgical procedures). The net result of these 
changes was 10 percent growth in the average DRG weight for AM1 patients 
receiving bypass, with a corresponding increase in payments for these patients. 
In contrast, the DRG weight for AM1 patients receiving angioplasty declined 
by over 40 percent, from 6.62 in 1984 (a level near that of bypass surgery) to 
4.52 in 1991. This reduction was entirely attributable to the reduced weight of 
the DRG associated with angioplasty. 
Table 2.5 summarizes how these DRG weights translate into Medicare pay- 
ments per AM1 patient in  1984 and  1991. As the first row shows, average 
spending on AMIs was $11,175 in 1984 and $14,722 in 1991 (both in $1991), 
implying an annual growth rate of 4.1 percent. By comparison, average spend- 
ing per Medicare beneficiary was $2,581 in 1984 and $3,226 in 1991, an an- 
nual growth rate of 3.2 percent. 
This growth in treatment costs is substantial. With about 230,000 admissions 
annually, total reimbursement for heart attacks alone rose from $2.6 billion in 
1984 to $3.4 billion in  1991, an increase of  $0.8 billion. This is nearly  10 
percent of the increase in all Medicare inpatient spending over this period. 
Indeed, Medicare spending  on heart  attacks alone was a third  of  the total 
amount that Medicaid spent on poor children in 1991. 
The substantial increase in AM1 reimbursement occurred despite falling or 
flat DRG weights  for all categories  of  intensive treatment,  suggesting that 
shifts in the probabilities of treatment in each intensity category were the key 
factors in the growth of AM1 expense in the past decade. To demonstrate this 
hypothesis, we decompose spending growth into prices and quantities of pro- 
cedures. 
9. In addition, as we discuss below, many more hospitals are performing catheterizations; fewer 
patients must be transferred (and hence readmitted) to undergo the procedure. 62  David M. Cutler and Mark B. McClellan 
Table 2.5  Growth in Spending for AMIs, 1984-91 
Measure 
Year  Annual 
1984  1991  Change 
Percentage 
Average reimbursement ($) 





Price index ($) 







































Nore: Costs for 1984 are in 1991 dollars, adjusted using the GDP deflator. 
”Growth is average percentage point change each year. 
We begin with the identity that spending per AM1 is the product of the price 




SpendIAMI, =  e,,  -  q,,,  . 
,=I 
In our case, there are four possible treatments (T = 4). 
The middle block of  table 2.5 shows average reimbursement for patients 
with each treatment, and the bottom block shows the share of patients receiving 
each treatment, in  1984 and  1991, The real price of  treatment for patients 
whose AM1 was medically managed rose by only 1.3 percent annually. As table 
2.4 indicated, the real price of treatment fell  substantially for patients who 
received  invasive cardiac  procedures.  Reimbursement  for patients  who re- 
ceived catheterization only fell by 1.6 percent annually, reflecting the reduction 
in DRG weights and increased occurrence of catheterizations during the first 
admission. Reimbursement for PTCA fell by 5.9 percent annually. Reimburse- 
ment for CABG rose, but by only 1.9 percent annually. 
We form a “price index” for AM1 using equation (3). Holding quantities 
constant, the price index is given by 
T 
Price index,  = C cr  . q,,i, 
!=I 63  What Is Technological Change? 
where ris quantity in some base year. Using 1991 quantities as weights sug- 
gests a price decline of 0.2 percent annually.’O This decline reflects the real 
reductions  in  the  update  factor,  the  regulatory  changes  in  DRG  relative 
weights, and the changes in admission patterns for AM1 patients we have de- 
scribed. 
In contrast to the price reductions, there was a dramatic increase in the utili- 
zation of high-tech procedures. As figure 2.3 and the bottom panel of table 2.5 
show, catheterization  rates, bypass surgery rates, and angioplasty rates rose 
consistently throughout our study period. The share of  patients receiving a 
catheterization rose from 11 percent to 4 1 percent, an increase of nearly 300 
percent.  The share of  patients  receiving bypass  surgery nearly  tripled, and 
the share of patients receiving angioplasty rose 10-fold. Indeed, as figure 2.3 
shows, the increase in quantity of  care was essentially continuous over this 
period. 
Analogous to the price index, we can form an index of real resource intensity 
from equation (3) by  holding prices constant  and evaluating the change in 
quantities: 
T 
Resource index,  = ZP,,  - 
i=l 
Using reimbursement levels in  1991 as the index prices, average resource in- 
tensity rose by 2.9 percent annually. Figure 2.4 shows resource use annually. 
Real resource use increased by 2 to 3 percent essentially each year. 
Changes in q,,,  and thus in the resource index reflect two factors. First, the 
treatment of “similar” patients over time may change. Second, the mix of pa- 
tients may change; AM1 patients in  1991 might be more suitable candidates 
for intensive procedures than AM1 patients in 1984. Younger patients, for ex- 
ample, are more likely to receive intensive treatments than older patients. An 
increasing share of  younger patients over time would naturally translate into 
an increasing procedure rate. It is important to determine the extent to which 
our finding of  increasing resource utilization is the result of changes in the 
composition of patients, versus changes in procedure use for a given set of pa- 
tients. 
To address this issue, we classify patients along four dimensions: age (65- 
69,70-74,75-79,80-89,  and 90+), sex, race, and severity of illness. To char- 
acterize treatment of patients with poorer health status, we identified AM1 pa- 
tients with one or more of the following comorbid conditions noted at the time 
of AMI: renal disease, cerebrovascular disease, chronic pulmonary disease, di- 
abetes, and cancer. 
Table 2.6 shows information on the distribution of patients across these dem- 
10. Using 1984 quantities as weights yields a price increase of  1 percent annually. The differ- 
ence is that the large price decrease for angioplasty is essentially uncounted when initial-year 
quantity weights are used. 64  David M. Cutler and Mark B. McClellan 
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Fig. 2.4  Resource use for AM1 
ographic groups. On average, the AM1 population was older in  1991 than in 
1984, and more likely to have a severe comorbidity  reported. There was no 
substantial change in the sex or racial mix of the population. As the next col- 
umns show, older patients and more severely ill patients are less likely to re- 
ceive intensive treatment  (in this case any surgical procedure)  than younger 
patients and patients who are less severely ill. Thus, the changes in the demo- 
graphic mix of  the population suggest procedure use wouldfull over time, not 
rise. Indeed, as the last column of the table shows, the use of intensive cardiac 
procedures increased in prevalence in all of the particular demographic groups 
we consider. 65  What Is Technological Change? 
Table 2.6  Changes in the Demographic Mix  of  the AM1 Population, 1984-91 
Percentage with Surgical 
Demographic Composition (%)  Procedure (%) 
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Source: Authors' calculations based on microdata for 1984 and 1991. 
We can quantify this observation using the resource index noted above. De- 
noting by qd.r  the share of  patients in demographic group d at time t, we can 
rewrite the quantity index as 
TD 
Resource index,  = cxP.i  *  qd,,  *  qi,d,,  . 
i=l  d=l 
We can then decompose the growth of the quantity index into three parts: the 
change in procedure utilization within demographic groups (Aqi.d),  the change 
in the share of the population in different demographic groups (Aq,),  and the 
covariance between the change in the share of patients and the change in proce- 
dure utilization 
The decomposition into these three terms yields the following: 
Decomposition of Resource Intensity Growth 
Share Due To  Amount ($)  Percentage 
Total  2,7 11 
Intensity  3,012 
Demographics  -114 
Covariance  -188 
111 
-4 
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Demographic change has a small negative effect on growth in resource use for 
AM1 treatment. All of the growth in expenditures is due to increased intensity 
of treatment within demographic groups. 
In summary: The experience of AM1 in the elderly illustrates extremely well 
the difficulties involved in Medicare cost containment. Since the mid- 1980s, 
reimbursement given the level of  technology has fallen by about 0.2 percent 
annually. Payments for catheterization and angioplasty fell in real terms, and 
reimbursement  for medical  management  and bypass  surgery  increased but 
only by a small amount. The dramatic increase in technology utilization, how- 
ever, more than made up for this price reduction. The share of  patients who 
received invasive cardiac procedures tripled, and the resource intensity of the 
average AM1 case rose by  almost 3 percent  annually. Essentially  all of  this 
change was the result  of  increased procedure utilization  for a given type of 
patient-within  age, sex, race, and illness severity groups-rather  than a shift 
in the distribution  of  patients. The result was a net increase in spending per 
patient of 4 percent annually. 
The experience of AM1 demonstrates that simply reducing hospital fees will 
not lead to long-run  cost containment if the volume of  intensive procedures 
continues to grow. Rather,  changes in the use of  technology  are the key to 
reducing health spending.” 
In  the remainder of this paper, we present further evidence on the nature 
of technological change in AM1 treatment. First, we examine the diffusion of 
intensive technologies for AM1 treatment across metropolitan  areas. By com- 
paring growth rates of angioplasty and bypass, we address whether there is any 
evidence that the  adoption  of  “cheaper”  intensive  treatments  such as angi- 
oplasty leads to less expenditure growth than might otherwise have been ob- 
served, and whether  there  is any evidence that technology  diffusion  differs 
systematically  across  areas.  Second,  we  examine  the  effect  of  technology 
adoption by hospitals on treatment decisions for their AM1 patients. This evi- 
dence is preliminary, but it suggests that more careful analysis of the determi- 
nants of technology diffusion may lead to a better understanding of how health 
care cost containment can be achieved. 
2.4  The Nature of Technological Change: Comparisons across 
Metropolitan Areas 
In the previous section, we showed that on net technological change led to 
increased  health costs. Some have argued, however, that the introduction of 
technologies such as angioplasty-a  less expensive and less morbid approach 
to revascularization-reduces  health cost growth. If the growth of angioplasty 
substituted for the growth of bypass surgery, the introduction of this technol- 
11. See Cutler (1  995a) for more discussion on the implications of this distinction for Medicare 
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ogy would lead to lower health expenditures than if these patients had received 
bypass surgery. Conversely, to the extent that angioplasty patients would not 
have undergone bypass surgery, the adoption of angioplasty has added to ex- 
penditures. 
The natural question, then, is whether the use of angioplasty substitutes for 
or complements the use of bypass surgery. To examine this issue, we use data 
on the change in the  share of patients receiving each treatment in different 
metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs).’* If angioplasty and bypass surgery are 
substitutes, then MSAs in which angioplasty grew most rapidly will have rela- 
tively  slower growth  in  bypass  surgery.  If  the  two  are  complements,  then 
growth of the two procedures will be positively correlated across MSAs. 
Figure 2.5 shows the growth in the rate of bypass surgery and angioplasty 
in different MSAs between  1984 and  1991, using data from 247 MSAs. The 
data are weighted by the number of patients in 1984. The figure does not sug- 
gest a strong correlation either positively or negatively. Some MSAs (such as 
Sioux Falls, S.D.,  and Lubbock, Tex.) have very rapid growth of  angioplasty 
and less rapid growth of bypass surgery, and others (such as Little Rock, Ark., 
and Savannah, Ga.) have rapid growth of bypass surgery but not of angioplasty. 
On net, however, there appears to be little relation between the growth of the 
two procedures.  Indeed, the correlation is only  -.03.  There is therefore no 
evidence that the growth of angioplasty has led to a reduction in bypass sur- 
gery, and thus a cost savings. 
In addition, we can use area-level comparisons to examine two alternative 
views of technology diffusion. One is that some areas are technological “lead- 
ers” and others are “followers.” The leading areas of innovation-for  example, 
areas with major medical facilities and major metropolitan areas-adopt  tech- 
nologies first, then “follower” areas catch up. In this scenario, to understand 
why technological change is so rapid we would need to understand the incen- 
tives of  the leaders-why  they  choose to innovate,  in what directions they 
choose to innovate-and  of followers-why  they choose to imitate, and whom 
they choose to imitate. 
An alternative view is that areas “specialize” differently. This hypothesis 
suggests that different areas will innovate in different ways, either as a result 
of an active effort to set themselves apart or as a result of different “random 
walks” in technology adoption. For example, cardiologists in some areas may 
concentrate on developing innovations  in bypass  surgery, or may  happen to 
have a good series of experiences with patient outcomes, while cardiologists 
in other areas may have better experiences with medical management or angi- 
12. The comparisons in this paper are based on simple population means; they are not  “ad- 
justed for demographic differences across MSAs. We  plan to estimate more general models in 
future work, but we have no reason to expect that these adjustments will have any substantial effect 
on our results. Like previous investigators, we find little variation in the demographic composition 
of AM1 patients across MSAs. Moreover, in the previous section we demonstrated that technologi- 
cal growth has been a general phenomenon, not confined to any particular demographic groups. 68  David M. Cutler and Mark B. McClellan 
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Fig. 2.5  Growth of bypass and angioplasty, 1984-91 
oplasty. If  this scenario is correct, we need to understand the incentives or 
historical accidents driving different areas to specialize in different treatments, 
and how one treatment comes to dominate another. Differentiating between 
these two views is clearly essential to our understanding of the dynamics of 
technological change. 
As a first pass at these alternative hypotheses, table 2.7 shows the correlation 
of  technological utilization in different areas in  1984 and 1991. Consider in 
particular  the correlation between  bypass surgery  and angioplasty. If some 
areas are technological leaders, the rates of these two procedures will be posi- 
tively correlated. If  areas specialize in new technologies, however, the proce- 
dure rates will be negatively correlated. As table 2.7 shows, rates of bypass 
surgery and angioplasty are strongly positively correlated in both 1984 (.437) 
and 1991 (.359). The implication is that the same areas are more advanced in 
the use of both technologies. 
Indeed, using the dynamic aspect of the data, we can address this question 
in more detail. Since angioplasty was essentially new in 1984, we can examine 
which areas applied this technology most rapidly over the  1984-91  period. 
We divide MSAs into three groups: (1) those that were most technologically 
advanced (defined as bypass surgery rates of  at least 5 percent-roughly  the 
mean level in 1984); (2) those that were “medium technology” areas (defined 
as catheterization rates of at least 5 percent but bypass surgery rates below 5 
percent);  and  (3) those  that  were  least  technologically  advanced  (the  re- 
maining areas). 
Figure 2.6 shows the growth of angioplasty rates for these three areas. While 
all three areas had increases in  the rate of  angioplasty over time, the figure 
shows a clear positive relation between initial rates of technology utilization 
and subsequent growth of angiopiasty. In 1984, angioplasty rates were essen- 69  What Is Technological Change? 
Table 2.7  Correlation of Technologies across Areas 
Technology  Catheterization  F’TCA  CABG 
I984 
Catheterization  1 .ooo 
PTCA  .502  1.000 
CABG  .62  1  ,437  1.000 
I991 
Catheterization  1  .000 
PTCA  .411  1.000 
CABG  .369  .359  1 .Ooo 
~  ~~~~ 
Note: The correlations are for 247 MSAs and are weighted by  the  number of AMIs in that MSA 
and year. 
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Fig. 2.6  Growth of angioplasty by MSA treatment intensity in 1984 
tially equal (and close to zero) in all areas. By  1988, high-technology  areas 
had angioplasty rates that were close to 4 percentage points above medium- 
technology areas and about 6 percentage points greater than low-technology 
areas. The data strongly suggest that a model of leaders and followers is more 
appropriate than one of specialization of technology. 
What makes certain areas technology leaders, and what determines how 
closely other areas follow? Examining this issue in detail is beyond our scope 
here, but we do consider one simple explanation. It is commonly asserted that 
major teaching centers are the leaders in  technological innovation  and  that 
other areas simply follow the teaching centers. 
To examine this hypothesis, we first developed a definition of “major teach- 
ing areas”:  the  14 U.S. cities with at least 1,000 medical residents in  1990. 70  David M. Cutler and Mark B. McClellan 
These areas are common to most lists of innovative practice in medicine: At- 
lanta, Baltimore, Boston, Chicago, Cleveland, Dallas, Detroit, LOS  Angeles, 
Nassau-Suffolk  County, New York, Philadelphia, Pittsburgh, St. Louis, and 
Washington, D.C. We then divided our MSA sample into three groups based 
on distance to a teaching center: (1) within 20 miles of a major teaching center 
(about 20 percent of the patients); (2)  between 20  and 250 miles (about 50 
percent  of the patients); and (3) over 250 miles (about 30 percent of the pa- 
tients). 
Figure 2.7 shows the growth of angioplasty in each of these three areas. The 
most striking conclusion is that technological  change does not appear to be 
most rapid in areas with the most teaching hospitals. Indeed, major teaching 
centers are, if anything, less likely to perform angioplasty than are areas farther 
away.  Clearly, other factors mediate the extent of  technology diffusion. We 
intend to explore these factors more fully in future work. Previous research has 
shown that one important factor is technology adoption decisions by particular 
hospitals in each MSA, and we turn to evidence on the role of hospital technol- 
ogy adoption decisions now. 
2.5  The Nature of Technological Change: Comparisons 
across Hospitals 
Hospitals cannot provide high-tech care if they do not have the capability to 
do so. Performance of cardiac catheterization, angioplasty, and bypass surgery 
at a hospital each requires substantial investment in specialized equipment and 
0.15  O'* 1 
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staffing by medical and nursing personnel with the technical expertise to per- 
form the procedure. Thus, any examination of technological change must in- 
volve hospital-level analysis of the utilization of different types of care. While 
estimating the determinants of  hospital-level  ifivestment decisions is beyond 
our scope here, an important first step in this analysis is to determine the contri- 
bution  of  technology  diffusion  between  and  within  hospitals  to  intensity 
growth in AM1 treatment. If increased procedure use largely  reflects  a one- 
time shift in the propensity of  the hospital’s physicians to treat patients with 
intensive procedures, then the analysis of technological change should concen- 
trate on these adoption decisions. On the other hand, if most technology diffu- 
sion  is  within-hospital,  then  analyses  should concentrate  on how  practices 
change within a hospital given the availability of intensive resources. 
In previous work, McClellan (1993) and McClellan and Newhouse (1994) 
examined the differential use of intensive procedures in AM1 treatment across 
hospitals. Those papers documented that having and adopting the capacity to 
perform intensive procedures was associated with much higher rates of proce- 
dure use. These hospital-level differences in procedure use were not explained 
by observed or unobserved differences in patient mix across the hospitals. In 
this section, we quantify the contribution of new technology adoption by hos- 
pitals and of within-hospital diffusion (given the hospital’s technological capa- 
bilities) to the growth in AM1 treatment intensity. 
Examining technological change at the hospital level requires a method for 
assigning patients to specific hospitals. There is more than one admitting hos- 
pital, however, when  a patient is transferred or readmitted. To focus on the 
episode of care, we classify patients by the hospital they were initially admitted 
to. With this classification, inany patients will receive intensive surgery even 
if they were initially admitted to a nonintensive  hospital. Understanding the 
propensity of these transfers and readmissions, however, is an important com- 
ponent of analyzing technological change. 
Figure 2.8 shows cardiac catheterization rates for patients grouped by  the 
year of  adoption of the capacity to perform catheterization at the hospital to 
which they were initially  admitted. The figure shows that in  1984, patients 
admitted to hospitals that were already performing catheterization were more 
than twice as likely to receive the procedure as those admitted to noncatheter- 
ization hospitals. The gap in procedure use between catheterization and non- 
catheterization hospitals increased steadily in absolute terms during the subse- 
quent eight years, from 10 to 22 percentage points. This divergence in practice 
patterns  between  catheterization  and noncatheterization  hospitals over time 
suggests that within-hospital differences in technology diffusion are correlated 
with the hospital’s technological capabilities. 
However, figure 2.8 also confirms that hospital technology adoption deci- 
sions have a fundamental impact on how AM1 patients are treated by the hospi- 
tal. Within two years after adoption, catheterization rates consistently increase 
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Fig. 2.8  Catheterization rate by year of technology acquisition 
centage points of the current catheterization rate at the hospitals adopting be- 
fore  1984. Moreover, even after several years of  reequilibration, subsequent 
trends in catheterization rates remain higher than the preadoption trend. Thus, 
adoption  not only had a one-time effect on the use of  intensive procedures; 
it also affected subsequent technological  change in the treatment of AM1 at 
the hospital. 
Figures 2.9 and 2.10 show analogous trends in bypass  surgery  and angi- 
oplasty rates for patients grouped on the basis of the capabilities of the hospital 
to which they were initially admitted. The same kinds of effects-substantial 
one-time step-ups in procedure use and differential long-term growth rates in 
procedure use-are  also evident here. Indeed, within two years of  acquiring 
bypass surgery technology, essentially all hospitals performing this surgery do 
so at the same rate. For angioplasty, technological utilization is correlated with 
initial year of acquisition, even several years out. 
In table 2.8, we quantify the contribution of these different types of hospital- 
level technological change to intensity growth. In 1984, 35 percent of patients 
were admitted to hospitals that performed catheterization; the share of patients 
admitted to these hospitals increased by 3 percentage points during the panel. 
These hospitals had relatively rapid growth in catheterization use-averaging 
almost 5 percentage points per year-and  thus accounted for a disproportion- 
ate share of total growth (45 percent). In contrast, the share of patients treated 
at hospitals that did not have the capacity to perform catheterization by  1991 
declined by 5 percentage points, and catheterization rates increased by an aver- 
age annual rate of only 3 percentage points; consequently, this group of hospi- 
tals accounted for only one-fourth of the growth in catheterization use. Finally, 
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Fig. 2.10  Angioplasty rate by year of technology acquisition 
1984 and  1991 increased  slightly, and catheterization rates increased  by  as 
much  as  at  the  hospitals  performing  catheterization  in  1984. (The  higher 
growth rates compared to hospitals with catheterization in the few years after 
adoption appear to be approximately balanced by the lower growth rates in the 
years before adoption, so that the cumulative change in rates is comparable.) 
These hospitals consequently accounted for slightly more of the growth in pro- 
cedure use than their share of patients would suggest. The bottom two panels of Table 2.8  Sources of Technology Utilization by Hospital Type in 1984 
Technology Status 
Share of  Patients (%)  Technology Utilization (%) 
Share of Total 
1984  1991  Change (%)  1984  1991  Change (%)  Changea (%) 
Catheterization 
Acquired by  1984 
Acquired between 1984 and 1991 
None by  1991 
Bypass surgery 
Acquired by  1984 
Acquired between 1984 and 1991 
None by  199  1 
Angioplasty 
Acquired by  1984 
Acquired between 1984 and 1991 
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table 2.8, which show comparable statistics for bypass surgery and angioplasty, 
demonstrate qualitatively similar effects. 
Figures 2.8 through 2.10 and table 2.8 demonstrate that both kinds of tech- 
nological  change at hospitals-one-time  changes in treatment decisions re- 
sulting from changes  in  technology  availability  and  long-term  changes  in 
trends in treatment intensity associated with technology availability-contrib- 
ute substantially to technological change. 
One might  suspect that  as technologies become  more widespread across 
hospitals, within-hospital technological change would become relatively more 
important for further growth. Indeed, if  we had analyzed a shorter panel of 
AM1 patients, then the share of growth associated with changes in technologi- 
cal capabilities at hospitals would have been smaller, because a smaller share 
of patients would have been treated by  the smaller number of  adopting hos- 
pitals. 
Figures 2.11 and 2.12 address the dynamics of new adoption of catheteriza- 
tion and angioplasty versus expansion to additional patients by hospitals. The 
figures decompose growth in the rates of procedure utilization into the shares 
due to hospitals that adopted the procedure within the preceding year (“New” 
section, top), to hospitals that adopted the procedure in earlier years (“Old” 
section,  middle),  and  to hospitals  that  had  not  yet  adopted  the  procedure 
(“Never” section, bottom). Figure 2.1 1 documents that, even by  1985, catheter- 
ization was a relatively  mature technology  in  that  increasing  intensity  was 
mostly due to increased use in hospitals that already had adopted catheteriza- 
Fig. 2.11  Share of change in catheterization rate by new technology acquisition 76  David M. Cutler and Mark B. McClellan 
Fig. 2.12  Share of change in angioplasty rate by new technology acquisition 
tion.  As  catheterization  continued  to  diffuse,  the  share  of  catheterization 
growth attributable to additional hospital adoptions declined, from close to 20 
percent of the growth in 1985 to around 10 percent of the growth by 1991. 
In contrast, adoption of angioplasty during the initial years was much more 
among hospitals just acquiring the procedure. In 1985, the share of utilization 
growth due to new adopters was almost exactly the same as the share due to 
hospitals that already had the procedure. By 1991,  however, much more of the 
growth was within hospitals that had already acquired the procedure, rather 
than among new  hospitals.  Clearly, understanding the nature of  technology 
diffusion requires a model both of the initial adoption decision and of the in- 
crease in technology utilization within hospitals over time. 
2.6  Conclusion 
In this paper, we have reviewed the sources of Medicare expenditure growth 
for heart attacks in elderly Medicare beneficiaries. We found that all expendi- 
ture growth was attributable to growth in the use of intensive cardiac proce- 
dures. Two of these technologies, cardiac catheterization and bypass surgery, 
were relatively established in 1984.  A third technology, angioplasty, was essen- 
tially new in 1984. All three of these technologies expanded rapidly over the 
period  1984-91,  however, resulting in cost growth of 4 percent annually. 
Given  the  critical  importance  of  these  technologies  for  Medicare  cost 
growth,  we  then  turned  to some preliminary  explorations  of  the  nature  of 77  What Is Technological Change? 
changes in their use. Analysis across MSAs documented that angioplasty did 
not appear to be a cost-saving technology in the sense that its diffusion led to 
reductions in more intensive types of surgery. The analysis across MSAs also 
showed that certain areas appeared to be “leaders” and others “followers” in 
terms of trends in technology use, though more aggressive use of intensive 
technologies was not associated with being a medical center. We then turned 
to preliminary analyses at the hospital level, which showed not only that tech- 
nology adoption had a dramatic effect on treatment decisions for AM1 patients 
at the hospital at a point in time but also that adoption led to a fundamental 
shift in the growth rate of technology use at the hospital. 
We have documented that both area- and hospital-level factors have substan- 
tial effects on technological change in the treatment of AMIs. What remains is 
to analyze how these factors are related, and thus to develop a more compre- 
hensive model of how technological change is mediated. Does earlier technol- 
ogy adoption by hospitals in an area, or more rapid changes in treatment pat- 
terns at hospitals that have adopted intensive technologies, contribute to more 
rapid growth in the “leading” areas? What area characteristics are associated 
with relatively rapid growth? How do these factors affect hospital technology 
adoption decisions? While such analyses have been conducted in other indus- 
tries (see the review in Griliches 19SS), they have rarely been addressed in this 
context. Answering such questions, however, appears crucial for understanding 
growth in health spending. 
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Comment  Jonathan Gruber 
Cutler and McClellan’s paper focuses on what is, in my view, the most impor- 
tant topic in health economics today: the diffusion of new medical technolog- 
ies. The rapid rise in medical costs over the past 40 years, as medical spending 
has tripled as a share of GNP, is a natural source of concern to both academics 
and policymakers. Careful efforts to account for this cost increase by factors 
such as the aging of the population, increased incomes, or increased insurance 
coverage has left the majority of the increase unexplained. And this residual is 
generally attributed to “technological advance” in medicine. 
This attribution, however, raises two critical questions. First, can we find 
direct evidence that technological  advance is the culprit? As with any such 
exercise, labeling a residual by default is never very satisfying. So rather than 
calling the residual “technology,” we need to document that it is in fact new 
technologies that are driving medical costs upward. While, on one level, this 
is just an accounting exercise, it is also the crucial first step toward thinking 
about whether we want a policy response to rising costs, and how to design 
that policy response. 
Second, what drives technological adoption and diffusion in the health care 
sector? While analysts such as Burt Weisbrod have written “big think” pieces 
conjecturing about the source of technological advance, there is strikingly little 
hard evidence on the critical factors driving diffusion. 
This ambitious paper tries to tackle both of these questions. Ultimately,  I 
think  that the authors do a good job on the first, but they  only scratch the 
surface of the second. 
They begin by  noting that price regulation in Medicare has not been able to 
slow cost growth in that program. Despite aggressive reimbursement reforms 
under Medicare’s Prospective Payment System (PPS), costs are rising just as 
fast now as they were in the years before price regulation. As McClellan (1993) 
showed, the main reason why costs keep rising for Medicare is that there has 
been a huge rise in surgical admissions, and surgical diagnosis-related groups 
(DRGs) are reimbursed more highly than nonsurgical DRGs. 
This paper illustrates that point in more detail, within the context of a spe- 
cific illness, acute myocardial infarction (AMI). I think that the most interest- 
ing results in the paper are in table 2.5, which decomposes the 4.1 percent 
Jonathan Gruber is professor of  economics at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and a 
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annual increase in reimbursement for AM1 into price and treatment changes. 
The authors find that, if AM1 had been treated in a constant way over time, 
average reimbursement would have actually fallen. This is because Medicare, 
perhaps in reaction to increasing AM1 costs, lowered the reimbursement rate 
for some of the “high-tech” means of treating AMIs. As a result, the large rise 
in costs was driven solely by  a shift in the treatment of AMIs toward more 
expensive interventions. Thus, this provides some of  the first solid evidence 
for technological change as a source of medical cost increase. 
I have two reactions to these interesting findings. First, on a picky note, there 
is potentially a price index problem here. The authors use the 1991 prices and 
distribution of treatments to calculate their price and quantity indexes. Given 
the dramatic shift in treatment styles from 1984 to 1991, I would be interested 
to see how sensitive their answers are to the base year chosen. But my guess is 
that the result would be relatively robust. 
Second, and more important,  this finding immediately  raises the second 
question posed above: what was the source of this rapid technological change? 
Was it driven by innovations in medical treatment techniques that were exoge- 
nous to changes in Medicare pricing policy? Or was it an endogenous response 
to the reimbursement schedule set up by Medicare, which reimbursed intensive 
interventions much more highly? Health economists like to draw an analogy 
between trying to regulate medical costs and squeezing a pillow-if  you try to 
do it by squeezing one end, you just get a larger response on the other side. In 
this case, the side that is being squeezed is treatment-specific prices, and the 
side where you may see the responses is changes in treatment technology. 
So the key question is: would we have seen this dramatic change in the 
treatment of AM1 in the absence of PPS, or was it caused by the pricing struc- 
ture put in place by Medicare, as the “pillow” hypothesis would suggest? If 
technological advance was exogenous to Medicare policy, then this is an inter- 
esting descriptive exercise on why Medicare could not control costs, but it has 
little policy weight. But if it was an endogenous response, then it suggests that 
this type of pillow effect is critical, and that it must be incorporated in analyz- 
ing the net effects on the program of changing relative prices. 
I bring this up because I think that the authors could do a lot more here. In 
particular, during their sample period we see dramatic changes in the relative 
reimbursements of these different treatments for AMI. For example, they re- 
port that in 1990 the reimbursement rate for angioplasty was halved. Did use 
of angioplasty respond? Did we see a slowing of the rapid move toward this 
new type of technology? More generally, the authors have a critical opportunity 
here to move beyond simply describing the technological change to ask what 
role reimbursement policy played. 
The authors do spend some time trying to model the use of new technolog- 
ies, using  variation  in  technology  use  across  metropolitan  statistical  areas 
(MSAs). The most interesting question that they ask is whether the increased 
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alternative treatments such as bypass surgery. This is important because it is 
popularly perceived that new medical technologies can be money saving, much 
like technology in other areas such as computers. But health economists are 
largely skeptical of this claim. 
In fact, however, we have little existing evidence to support the skepticism 
of health economists. Cutler and McClellan attempt to provide such evidence 
by asking whether MSAs that saw increased use of  relatively low cost angi- 
oplasty also saw decreased use of high-cost bypass surgery. They find that, in 
fact, there is no correlation across MSAs in the change in these two types of 
treatments-that  is, places that starting using more angioplasty used no less 
bypass surgery. 
This is a striking finding, but I think that it is not fully convincing. This is 
sort of like the tests of the physician-induced demand hypothesis, which posits 
that physicians will respond to negative income shocks by doing more proce- 
dures on their patients. Most tests of  this view have generally proceeded by 
asking whether places with more surgeons have more surgery, and they have 
found that this is the case. But if there is some omitted area change that is 
correlated with taste for surgery, then this omission biases these tests toward 
finding a positive correlation between surgeon density and surgery rates. Simi- 
larly, in Cutler and McClellan’s data, if  there is some omitted MSA-specific 
change that leads individuals to demand more intensive interventions, then it 
will bias the authors toward finding a positive correlation between angioplasty 
changes and bypass changes. This could mask a true substitution pattern be- 
tween the two types of treatment. 
At a minimum, the authors need to control for demographic changes across 
areas. Another test might be to look at what was happening to bypass use right 
before angioplasty grew. That is, the authors could look at the difference in 
growth rates of  bypass before and after the widespread availability of angi- 
oplasty. Were the MSAs that adopted angioplasty the ones in which bypass was 
growing most rapidly anyway? 
In the final table, the authors try another accounting exercise, which is to 
decompose the total change in technology utilization into utilization in hospi- 
tals that had the technology in 1984, those that acquired it between  1984 and 
1991, and those that did not have it by  1991. The authors highlight the fact 
that, for catheterization, over half of the change was in hospitals that had the 
technology in 1984. The more striking finding, to my mind, is the rapid growth 
in catheterization at hospitals that did not have a catheterization lab by  1991. 
In fact, for revascularization, the majority of the growth occurs at hospitals that 
cannot do revascularization! 
The key to understanding these potentially confusing findings is the role of 
transfers and readmits. That is, the hospital to which the authors refer is the 
hospital  to which the person is admitted. If the patient  is then transferred or 
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catheterization or revascularization  capability, the patient can get the inten- 
sive treatment. 
I think that the huge role of transfers and readmits here is interesting and 
should not be overlooked, and it suggests two further directions for the analy- 
sis. First, the  authors could examine transfer and readmit patterns. For ex- 
ample, what is the maximum distance that most patients are transferred, or 
the farthest hospital to which they are readmitted? This could have important 
implications for the finding that being near a teaching hospital is not associated 
with higher use of expensive technology. This finding could simply result from 
the fact that even individuals far from a teaching hospital are transferred there 
for care. 
Second, they could look at within-MSA technology adoption decisions. That 
is, the authors could turn to a within-area model of “leaders” and “followers,” 
versus “specialization.” Is there a “medical arms race,” whereby one hospital’s 
adoption of a technology triggers its adoption at nearby hospitals? Or do these 
technologies have more of a public goods feature, where some hospitals spe- 
cialize in their use, and other hospitals transfer patients to the hospitals that 
have the  technology? Once again, testing this  runs into the  same types  of 
omitted-variables bias problems encountered by the earlier results on technol- 
ogy substitution. But if the authors can deal with these problems this might be 
a fruitful direction to pursue in answering the second question, about what 
drives technological advance in the medical care marketplace. 
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